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For an IAC to exist, the performing act must constitute an "armed conflict" under Common Article 2 to the four Geneva Conventions.
11 If the act does not amount to an "armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties", there is no IAC, to which IHL does not apply. This sentiment was also echoed in Tadić, which notes that an "international armed conflict arises 'whenever there is a resort to armed force between States.'" 12 Prima facie, an "armed conflict" denotes some sort of kinetic force, however, in cyber operations, there is a lack of kinetic force. The main contention is whether kinetic force is a necessary condition precedent for an "armed conflict" to exist under IHL.
What amounts to an "armed conflict" or "resort to armed force" is not defined in any IHL treaties, 13 one has to look at the jurisprudence to tease out the definition of "armed conflict," and if it covers the scope of cyberwarfare. Most scholars posit the view that if a cyber-attack is attributable to a State, and the cyber-attack has the same effects as would kinetic force, it would reach the threshold of an "armed conflict." 14 This view is consistent with Pictet's commentary which adopts a broad view of the term "armed conflict" as "any difference arising between two
States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2." 15 According to Pictet, the first shot fired ("first shot theory") onto opposing forces is 11 trigger an "armed conflict." 22 States would also be keen to adopt this view as a pre-emptive measure to protect their infrastructures from a cyber-attack. Without an "armed conflict," the protective mechanisms in IHL will not apply, 23 leading States to be more vulnerable in managing their critical infrastructures. This is inconsistent with the object and purpose of IHL.
Another approach is to examine the "mens rea" requirement for an "armed conflict" to occur. Various literature has examined different major incidents between States that have not been treated as "armed conflict" despite meeting the necessary threshold requirements of an IAC (i.e.
Dogger Bank Incident; USS Liberty Incident; USS Stark Incident)
. 24 In contrast to minor incidents where States have asserted that "such situations and their consequences fell within the scope of the Geneva Conventions" (e.g. Iran Air Incident). 25 The only difference between the two scenarios was based largely on the perceived intentions and threat assessments of the other party, an assessment which is often influenced by realpolitik. Melzer notes, "in the absence of a formal declaration of war, an IAC requires a minimal transgression, which expresses the belligerent intent of the acting state against another." 26 It can be deduced that what amounts to an "armed conflict"
is really based on intent, rather than the factual circumstance.
If the cyber-attack amounts to a Common Article 2 "armed conflict," IHL applies. Once IHL applies, it is imperative to evaluate whether a cyber-operation is an "attack" within the meaning of Article 49(1) in API -to which relevant IHL restrictions (i.e. distinction, proportionality, precaution, etc.) apply. insofar it does not cause human suffering or loss of lives. 41 With respect, Schmitt's narrow approach is too under-inclusive, it would be incongruous to posit that anything which falls short of "physical damage" is not damage at all. If the machine, or infrastructure, has lost its function to operate because of a cyber-attack due to cyber interference and/or disruptions, it is "damaged" to the extent that the purpose of the infrastructure has been hindered (i.e. WannaCry ransomware).
An object does not need to be physically damaged to render it unusable. Schmitt's approach would not be feasible during a cyber-attack given that data and information can always be restored (due international community that using chemical weapons during an internal armed conflict is a prohibited attack "neutralization" denotes that it would be "irrelevant whether an object is disabled through destruction or in any other way." 45 This shows that the drafters held the view that "attacks," may not only lead to the destruction of objects, but may also lead to the loss of functioning without necessarily destroying it. Furthermore, by examining the travaux préparatoires of API, it was observed that the laying of mines constituted an "attack" "whenever a person is directly endangered by a mine laid." 46 Analogously, a single penetration of a piece of malicious code which does not necessarily meet the threshold of harm required for there to be "damage" or "destruction of object," constitutes as an "attack" under API.
Once an "attack" has occurred, the relevant restrictions in IHL apply. This will be discussed in the next few sections.
III. DISTINCTION IN CYBERSPACE
The principle of distinction is set out in Article 48 of API, which reads: the United States expanded the definition to include "war-sustaining" objects, 63 and the Commentary on the AMW Manual which drastically expanded "military objectives" to include a "temporal" element ("temporary military objectives by nature"). 64 A new and narrower approach has to be adopted for cyber-distinction. 65 This paper will seek recourse to Articles 56 and 58 of API as new interpretations for "military objectives."
The entire scope of Article 56 delegitimizes "military objectives," that they "shall not be made the object of attack, […] , if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population." 66 Analogous to cyber-space, major cyber infrastructures which civilians heavily rely on should not be made the object of attack even if it is a "military objective." Though, it might, or might not, lead to "severe losses among the civilian population," the effects of a global-outage of dual-use civilian cyber infrastructures would be to that effect -that the destruction or neutralization of civilian cyber infrastructures would result in significant civilian impact which would outweigh any military benefits. 67 To argue otherwise would be against the object and purpose of IHL, which aims to balance between military necessity and humanity. Hence, to include dual-use civilian cyber objects within the ambit of "military objective" would not be a feasible option as doing so will give preference to military necessity over humanity. That is not to say that every civilian cyber object should not be made the target of attack, doing so will also give preference to humanity over military necessity (and getting State consensus over this narrow interpretation will be tenuous). Article 56(2) gives guidance as to when the "special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease." 68 The ICRC 
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A narrower approach should be adopted when interpreting "military objectives" vis-à-vis cyber space. 79 This approach would be the first step in which States are able to "direct their operations only against military objectives" 80 in cyberspace.
IV. PROPORTIONALITY IN CYBER SPACE
The principle of proportionality is one of the most contentious areas in IHL due to unavoidable civilian deaths, or destruction to civilian objects, as collateral damage in times of an armed conflict. 81 The application of the proportionality principle is mostly settled when it comes to traditional kinetic warfare; 82 the same cannot be said for cyber operations. Given the dual-use nature of most cyber infrastructures, the principle of proportionality is paramount in protecting civilians and civilian objects in the cyber domain. The proportionality principle is found in Article 51(5)(b) of API, which also reflects customary international law applicable in both IACs and NIACs. 83 Under Article 51(5)(b), an attack is prohibited if it "may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 84 As mentioned before, civilians can never be made the object of attack. 85 However, the principle of proportionality is an "exception" insofar that civilians, though not an object of attack, are collateral damages as a result of a lawful attack. For a lawful attack to occur, the commander must determine that the death, injury, and damage are not "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 86 There has been universal acceptance that the proportionality principle applies to cyber conflicts that constitute attacks, 87 but how it is to be 
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by the Stuxnet malware amount to "damage to civilian objects" (even if, hypothetically, it does not result in the destruction of nuclear centrifuges)? The kinetic analogy approach would limit almost all of the reported cyber operations from the proportionality analysis since "damage to civilian objects" in Article 51(5)(b) is a high threshold test. 92 Conversely, some scholars have argued that a mere change or modification in digital codes in a cyber infrastructure would amount to "damage" under the proportionality principle. 93 This approach would require military commanders to consider any, and every, effects on a cyber infrastructure in his/her proportionality analysis. 94 With respect, this approach is wrong. It fails to understand the fundamentals of the principle of proportionality. The proportionality principle recognizes that collateral damage to civilians and/or civilian objects may occur, 95 and setting such low a threshold for "damage" to account for penetrations and modifications of digital codes would be extremely excessive. This approach also adds more burden on military commanders having to take into account every aspect of a cyber operation, and whether the cyber operation would alter/modify a single piece of digital code. Furthermore, not all military commanders are versed in computer science to understand the intricacies of computer systems under their proportionality analysis.
As a corollary to Section 1, this paper takes the view that "damage" encompasses serious interruptions in functionality insofar that "damage" has occurred if the act impairs or hinders the intended function of the object. In Operation Olympic Games, the penetration of the Stuxnet malware which modified the programmable logic controller to the extent that its function to regulate nuclear centrifuges has been impaired, 96 constitutes as "damage to civilian objects" in the proportionality calculus. Thus, military commanders of Operation Olympic Games should factor potential loss of functionally of civilian objects into their proportionality calculus before launching the Stuxnet attack. If the functionality approach were to be adopted in cyber conflicts, the traditional kinetic approach would be of limited value. The functionality approach should be the 92 Jensen, Cyber Attacks, supra note 82, at 204-207. 93 WALTER G. SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 102 (1999) . 94 Jensen, Cyber Attacks, supra note 82, at 204-207. 95 Jensen, Cyber Attacks, supra note 82, at 208.
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preferred approach when dealing with the proportionality principle as it is neither too broad (i.e. kinetic approach), nor too narrow (i.e. mere change or modification approach). 97 Also, the functionality approach is consistent with the general principles of IHL as already discussed in Section I. By focusing on functionality, commanders are able to understand and apply the proportionality principle during a cyber conflict.
B. INDIRECT EFFECTS
The issue of whether indirect effects of an attack should be factored into the proportionality calculus is contentious under IHL given multiple positions put forth by States. 98 Indirect effects are "the delayed and/or displaced second-, third-, and higher-order consequences of action, created through intermediate events or mechanisms." 99 There has been differing State practice on this issue. The United States takes the view that "remote harms resulting from the attack do not need to be considered in a proportionality analysis," 100 while the United Kingdom maintains that "regard must also be had to the foreseeable effects of the attack." 101 "In any event, there is no dispute that indirect effects cannot be taken into account if they are too remote or cannot be reasonably foreseen." 102 This notion was also echoed by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Galić.
103
As Greenwood notes, the Gulf War of the 1990s highlighted the fact that indirect effects cause more harm to civilians than the direct effects of the attack itself. 104 In cyberwarfare, indirect effect includes damage that was beyond the scope of the intended attack, but results from that attack. 105 Unfortunately, most cyber infrastructures are dual-use infrastructures, and the effects of outside of Iran. 106 Whilst there are differing views as to whether indirect effects should be factored into the proportionality calculus in kinetic warfare, with regards to cyberwarfare, this paper believes that it should.
This indirect effect factor is consistent with the words "may be expected to cause" in Article 
V. DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN CYBER HOSTILITIES
Direct participation in hostilities ("DPH") is highly problematic for IHL due to the complex nature of the topic, and absent universal acceptance by States and legal scholars as to what amounts to DPH. 110 Determining DPH in traditional warfare is complex, "this is a fortiori the case when it 
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The Interpretive Guidance notes that DPH shall be defined as a specific act that meets three cumulative elements (Overall-Test):
"(1) the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and;
(2) there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and; (3) the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus)." an integral part of the act." 123 For the purposes of this paper, this Section will not discuss the temporal elements in cyber DPH.
As noted by the Israeli Court in Targeted Killings, "it is possible to take part in hostilities without using weapons at all." 124 Cyber-attacks were discussed in the Interpretive Guidance, 51(3) ), which gives weight to civilian protection immunity. It is important to note that the threshold of "harm" required, in the context of DPH, is higher than the threshold of "consequential harm" (low-threshold which accounts for disruptions) in the context of "attacks" in Article 49(1) API (discussed in Section I).
Though there is a distinction between the level of "harm" required to trigger the respective thresholds, both are aimed at protecting civilians from the harmful effects of war. As noted in the Interpretive Guidance, "the manipulation of computer networks […] will not qualify as DPH." 132 It is clear that mere cyber disruptions would not reach the required "threshold of harm." 133 If, for example, the cyber operation results in "death, injury, or destruction," the "threshold of harm" element is triggered, and DPH has occurred, subject to the second and third elements of the overalltest.
B. DIRECT CAUSATION
Unlike the "threshold of harm" criterion, "direct causation" element is subject to numerous debates and conflicting literature expressing differing opinions. 134 The Interpretive Guidance
states that "direct causation should be understood as meaning that the harm in question must be brought about in one causal step […] ." 135 The ICRC's approach has serious limitations to the cyber domain as most cyber-attacks will be indirect in effect, which is outside the scope of "one causal step." As noted in a National Research Council Report, "the desired effects of a cyber-attack are almost always indirect, which means that what are normally secondary effects are in fact of central importance." 136 The Interpretive Guidance indicates that indirect effects would not fall within the ambit of "one causal step," and the harm required must be objectively likely. 137 In a cyber- 148 (and many others) cite the need for a "case-by-case" approach.
C. BELLIGERENT NEXUS
The "belligerent nexus" element is the least contentious amongst the three. 149 The
Interpretive Guidance is silent on how the "belligerent nexus" element applies in times of cyberwarfare. However, absent guidance, it is relativity straightforward to tease out the legal parameters of "belligerent nexus." The Interpretive Guidance defines belligerent nexus as an act that "must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another." 150 DPH is only restricted to those individuals whose acts are integral to the hostilities. 151 Not all acts which result in harm can be linked to a party to the conflict as some civilian acts are driven by personal gain. If indirect consequence were intended, which results in foreseeable harm, "belligerent nexus" element would be satisfied, albeit failing the "direct causation" element. If the indirect consequence was neither intended nor foreseeable, but satisfies the "threshold of harm" element, DPH has not occurred as "belligerent nexus" and "direct causation" were not satisfied. The Interpretive Guidance gave the example of a bank robbery, in which a belligerent nexus does not exist as the act committed by the robber was not in support of a party to the conflict even though harm has been caused. 152 Schmitt argues that the "belligerent nexus" criteria should be defined differently as act in support or to the detriment of the party (cf. "in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another"). 153 Schmitt's approach, not surprisingly, was adopted in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 where "belligerent nexus" is interpreted as an act directly related to the hostilities. 154 The AMW Manual 155 The approach taken in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 would be more appropriate in times of cyberwarfare as there is an immediate nexus between the resulting act and the cyber operation. This author thinks that the nexus required in the Interpretive Guidance might be too far removed in times of cyberwarfare as there is no immediacy factor, it turns on whether the resulting act is "in support of [or detriment of] a party to the conflict." What is "in support" of and "to the detriment of" a party to the conflict lacks the immediacy factor required for belligerent nexus to be established. It adds a layer of the resulting act being attached to the parties involved, instead of to the resulting harm. Uncontentiously, belligerent nexus could become relevant at an earlier stage of the cyberwarfare, if the malware was written and designed specifically for a particular operation or act. 156 It may seem inconsistent with the Interpretive Guidance, but in times of cyberwarfare, a belligerent nexus can be established before the commission of the hostile act, rather than during, or after its been committed. 157 However, as before, States have agreed to take a "case-by-case" analysis of DPH. It remains to be seen if the Interpretive Guidance and/or the Tallinn Manual 2.0 will come to fruition in an actual cyber-conflict. The nature of IHL is always changing; one can only apply the law lex lata and theorize how the law should be applied in a given circumstance.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has critically examined the interaction between cyberwarfare and IHL. Section II argued how cyber-attacks are "armed conflict[s]" under Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions, which brings in the protective mechanisms of IHL. Furthermore, how cyber-attacks are "attacks" under Article 49(1) of API, to which relevant IHL restrictions apply. Section III has examined the difficulties of cyber-distinction due to dual-use objects in cyber-sphere. This paper has argued how a narrower interpretation of "military objectives" needs to be adopted which will alleviate the complexities of distinction vis-à-vis cyber-sphere. Section IV examined how the proportionality principle applies in cyberwarfare, and has critically examined two areas of the proportionality principle. In doing so, this paper argues that the functionality approach should be the preferred method when dealing with the proportionality principle, and that indirect effects 
